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We develop a simple theoretical model to examine the impact of the distribution of 
wealth on the patterns of trade when capital markets are imperfect.  Our model 
predicts that the dispersion of wealth can be a determinant of comparative advantage 
for low-income countries with poor financial institutions. We find support for these 
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       As  the  Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell  paradigm predicts, in a world where capital 
markets are perfect and production exhibits constant-returns to scale, aggregate 
wealth endowments can be an important source of comparative advantage, but their 
internal distribution does not matter for the patterns of international trade. This is 
because in the absence of financial frictions the only factor that determines the 
availability of external finance is a project’s net present value. In real life financial 
markets are far from perfect. Informational asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers, corporate governance quality shortcomings and non-negligible 
intermediation costs are only a sample of the types of problems that beset financial 
markets. The presence of financial frictions implies that an entrepreneur’s wealth is a 
second factor that lenders need to consider when providing external finance. 
Entrepreneurs with profitable projects but insufficient wealth cannot obtain external 
funds; i.e. they are financially constrained. A steadily growing literature examines the 
implications of financial constraints for the patterns and volume of international trade.  
       Much of the literature focuses on the quality of institutions.
1 In a recent paper Ju 
and Wei (2008) suggest that only for those countries with poor quality financial 
systems will financial constraints influence comparative advantage. For countries with 
well-functioning financial markets, finance is secondary to the real sector. Financial 
constraints are not sufficiently restrictive to prevent them from expanding those 
sectors where they have a comparative advantage. In contrast, for countries with poor 
quality institutions finance becomes a primary source of comparative advantage. 
When capital is not efficiently allocated its aggregate level becomes a poor predictor 
of economic performance. 
              In this paper, we argue that the same reasoning might also apply to the 
distribution of wealth, especially for economies that are not very wealthy. For a given 
level of endowments and institutional quality, those with higher inequality are less 
affected by financial frictions. The intuition is that a transfer of wealth from the poor 
to the relatively wealthy might alleviate financial constraints sufficiently to allow the 
economy to specialize in those sectors where it has a comparative advantage. This 
prediction is not entirely surprising given that it only extends the implications of the 
                                                            
1 See for example, Antras and Caballero (2009), Beck (2002), Bougheas and Falvey (2010), Chaney 
(2005), Egger and Keuschnigg (2009), Ju and Wei (2008), Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), Manova 
(2008b), Matsuyama (2005) and Wynne (2005).  
 Aghion and Bolton (1997) trickle-down argument to open economies. However, the 
prediction is derived from a simplified model that allows us to concentrate our 
analysis on the relationship between the wealth distribution and the patterns of trade. 
We analyze a two-sector model of trade with heterogeneous agents but we only allow 
for two levels of wealth endowments.
2 Nevertheless, even this simplified environment 
offers useful suggestions on the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications 
of the endowment distribution. 
  The possibility that the constraints of financial dependency can be overcome 
in different ways, may take on added significance in time off global financial 
upheaval. As we have recently observed, a financial crisis may sharply limit firms’ 
access to external finance, even in an otherwise efficiently functioning financial 
system. Where firms are heavily dependent on external finance their ability to export 
will be curtailed. Meanwhile those firms that rely on internal financing may also be 
adversely affected, but to a lesser degree. The latter may gain a competitive advantage 
in times of financial crisis. 
       We  also  take  a  first  look  at  international data from a sample that includes 
countries from all stages of development. Our preliminary findings on institutional 
quality and per-capita income confirm earlier results.
3 Our findings also provide some 
(albeit weak) evidence on the predicted relationship between income dispersion and 
comparative advantage.  
 
2. A Simple Model 
       Consider an economy with a population of N risk-neutral agents. These agents are 
of two types distinguished by their level of endowments of assets  . The proportion 
of poor agents is   and each is endowed with   units of assets, while the rich are 
endowed with         1    units of assets. Each agent is also endowed with one 
unit of labor. The total assets in the economy are             1            . The 
economy produces two final goods - a primary commodity and a manufacturing 
product. All agents have homothetic preferences allocating equal shares of their 
income to each good. Without loss of generality we assume that the manufacturing 
                                                            
2 See also Bougheas and Falvey (2010), Egger and Keuschnigg (2009), Foellmi (2010) and Wynne 
(2005) for other related work on the relationship between the distribution of wealth and international 
trade.  
3 See Beck (2003), Hur, Raj and Riyanto (2006), Manova (2008a,b) and Slaveryd and Vlachos (2005).  
 product is the numeraire and denote by    the price of the primary commodity. 
Production of one unit of the primary commodity requires the input of one unit of 
labor. In modeling the manufacturing sector we follow closely the fixed-investment 
model of Holmström and Tirole (1997). For the production of the manufacturing 
product there are two technologies available. The safe technology is constant returns 
to scale, requiring x unit of assets as input for the production of x units of final output. 
The risky technology involves an investment project of fixed size, involving an 
entrepreneur, who uses her labor endowment to run the project and one unit of assets 
as inputs. This technology yields     units of the manufacturing product with 
probability   and nothing with probability 1  . The probability of success of the 
project depends on the effort exerted by the entrepreneur. When the entrepreneur 
exerts a high level of effort      , while when her level of effort is low      . 
However, in the latter case she derives an additional benefit   . We assume that   
    1         which implies that the risky technology is socially efficient only 
when the entrepreneur exerts effort. 
        Since        1 , an entrepreneur with assets A wishing to adopt the risky 
technology must borrow 1   . We assume that this loan is repaid only if the project 
is successful. In a competitive financial market, the expected payoffs to entrepreneurs 
who do and don’t exert effort are, respectively 
          1        and           1         
where   denotes the equilibrium interest rate. The incentive compatibility condition 
that ensures that the borrower exerts the high level of effort is then given by 
                 1          
where the left-hand side is equal to the expected benefit of exerting a high level of 
effort.  
By setting the incentive compatibility condition to equality and solving for   
we derive a threshold level of initial endowments      1 
 
     
 
       such that 
only those agents with         can obtain external funds and thus become 
entrepreneurs. The quality of financial institutions is then captured by   
 
     . The 
smaller this variable, the higher the endowment threshold. From now on we assume 
that            for all relevant  ; put differently, we focus on equilibria where only 
the wealthy agents are financially unconstrained.        Our aim is to understand how changes in inequality can affect the pattern of 
international trade. In perfect financial markets, which in our case mean effort is 
observable, any agent with a project that has a positive present value can obtain 
external funds. What matters for obtaining the equilibrium is only the level of 
aggregate wealth and not its distribution. As we will see below this is not necessarily 
the case when we introduce financial market frictions.  
       It  turns  out  that  we  need  to  consider two general cases that depend on the 
proportion of poor agents. The total borrowing requirement if all rich agents 
undertake the risky project is        1     1      and the total assets available 
from poor agents are          . Equating these, one obtains the unique     at which 
aggregate wealth is just sufficient to finance the projects of all financially 
unconstrained agents  
      = 
   
      
Note that an increase in per capita wealth, through either the rich or the poor, reduces 
    . When       ,         and there will be some financially unconstrained agents 
that will be employed in the primary sector and invest their assets in the financial 
market; while when       ,      and some assets will be invested in the safe but 
low-return technology. 
 
2.1. Low  : Inequality and Financial Frictions are Irrelevant 
       In this case the proportion of agents that qualify for access to external funds is too 
high. The aggregate wealth in the economy is not sufficient to finance all eligible 
projects and thus some wealthy agents will enter the primary sector and invest their 
endowments of assets in the financial market. But all assets are invested in the more 
efficient but risky technology. As all wealthy agents are identical, in equilibrium, they 
must be indifferent between finding employment in the primary sector and becoming 
entrepreneurs, implying that                      1        in equilibrium. The 
left-hand side is equal to the expected income of a wealthy agent who decides to be 
employed in the primary sector and invests her wealth in the financial market, while 
the right-hand side is equal to the expected income of a wealthy agent who decides to 
become an entrepreneur. This condition can be simplified to 
(1)              revealing an unambiguously negative relationship between the equilibrium relative 
price of the primary good and the interest rate (expressed in terms of manufactures).  
As long as the financial market and one of the goods markets are in 
equilibrium the other goods market will also be in equilibrium. We focus on the 
market for the primary commodity. Let   denote the fraction of rich agents who enter 
the primary sector, which is determined by financial market clearing. The total supply 
of funds is         1      , which includes the supply of funds by the poor 
agents and the supply of funds by those rich agents employed in the primary sector. 
The demand for funds is    1    1    1     . Equating these and solving for   
we get 
 2            1  
   
                                                                                                             
All agents in the primary sector produce one unit so that the total supply of the 
primary commodity is         1     . Every agent in the economy spends half of 
her income on the primary commodity and thus total demand is  
    
      
      1      
      
     
 
   1  
      
    
Equating demand and supply and solving, we get 
(3)    
      
                                                                                                                   
Substituting (2) into (3) and using (1) we find that  
(4)
4     
      
                                                                                                                       
and 
(5)        
   
                                                                                                                       
Note that r is decreasing and P is increasing in    , but that neither of these solutions 
depends on the distribution of wealth in the economy. The reason is that financial 
constraints do not bind as there are agents eligible to obtain external funds but who 
                                                            
4 Equation (3) and (4) indicate a further constraint for the existence of this equilibrium. (3) must hold in 
the limiting case where   0  implying that     1 / 2  for   0 . The same issue is reflected in (4) 
where 1 2      is required for   0 . The point is that as an economy becomes wealthier through asset 
accumulation in this equilibrium, labour is withdrawn from the primary sector as more rich agents 
become entrepreneurs. Manufacturing output expands, primary output falls and so P rises and r falls. 
Eventually, given the constant expenditure shares, it becomes optimal to increase primary production, 
but this can only be achieved by switching assets to the safe technology thereby freeing up formerly 
entrepreneurial labour for use in the primary sector. Clearly in this case it is relative factor supplies 
rather than financial constraints that dictate the use of the safe technology, so we will not consider it 
further, other than to point out that this constraint does not apply to a small open economy where 
additional consumption of primary products can be provided through imports. opt not to do so. The equilibrium prices are the same as those that would  obtain in the 
absence of financial frictions. The only difference is that under perfect financial 
markets all agents would have been eligible to obtain funds, while here poor agents 
can only find employment in the primary sector. Any redistribution of wealth that 
maintains the average and leaves the proportion of poor people below the threshold 
level has no effect on the economy’s equilibrium. But changes in aggregate wealth do. 
All manufacturing output is produced using the more efficient technology and any 
extra wealth will be employed using that technology.  For any given {P, r}, an 
increase in aggregate wealth increases the demand for the primary product and 
reduces the supply as rich agents are drawn into the manufacturing sector, tending to 
increase  .  For given  , an increase in    increases the supply of funds without 
affecting the demand, while an increase in    increases the supply of funds and 
reduces the demand. In each case the response is a reduction in   and a fall in r
5. 
Finally, a higher expected return on the risky technology boosts both the demand for 
funds and the supply of the manufacturing product causing both prices to increase. 
 
2.2. High  : Inequality and Financial Frictions Matter 
       When  the  proportion  of  unconstrained agents is low the level of aggregate 
investment in the risky technology is lower than the level of aggregate endowments 
and some assets are invested in the safe technology. But for this to be the case poor 
agents must be indifferent between lending their endowments to entrepreneurs and 
investing them in the safe technology. Since the latter produces 1 unit of 
manufacturing output, this implies that the equilibrium interest rate must satisfy   
    1 . The quantity of assets borrowed for investment in the risky technology is  
  , and total investment in the risky technology is  1     . Investment in the safe 
technology is                    1     . Given that now only the poor agents 
produce the primary commodity its total supply is equal to   . Both types of agents 
spend half of their income on the primary commodity so that total demand is equal to   
 
 
                1              1        
 
               1 
            Equating the two sides of the market and solving for the price yields  
                                                            
5 The equilibrium volume of financial activity is       1     , which is increasing in  , but is only 
increasing in   as long as  1      1          initially. (6)    
                
                                                                                                          
As in the previous case an increase in either aggregate wealth or the expected return 
of the risky technology pushes the price up. Both changes boost the supply of the 
manufacturing product, the former by increasing the amount invested in the safe 
technology
6 the latter by increasing the productivity of the risky technology. But in 
this case the distribution of endowments also matters. An increase in the proportion of 
poor agents, which is equivalent to an increase in the mass of financially constrained 
agents, results in a withdrawal of funds from the risky-technology that are now 
invested in the less efficient safe technology. In addition, more agents enter the 
primary sector. All these changes boost the relative supply of the primary commodity 
and depress its price.  
       The reason that the distribution of income matters is because financial constraints 
are binding. Under perfect capital markets all funds would have been invested in the 
high-return risky technology. However, even if all agents have projects with positive 
present value only those with sufficiently high endowments,      , have access to 
external funds. Changes in the endowment distribution directly affect the mass of 
financially constrained agents and consequently the equilibrium under autarky. 
 
2.3. International Trade and the Distribution of Endowments 
       We assume that the economy is a price-taker in the world markets and we denote 
by    the world price of the primary commodity. If the autarky price is below the 
world price         then the economy will have a comparative advantage in, and 
thus export, the primary commodity. In contrast, if the world price is below the 
autarky price          then the exporting sector will be manufacturing. Consider 
once more the two cases analyzed above. 
       We  know  that  when  the  proportion of poor agents is low, changes in the 
distribution of wealth do not have any effect on the autarky price. Without affecting 
the autarky price they cannot affect the patterns of trade. As in the case where the 
financial market is frictionless changes in the distribution of wealth do not have any 
real effects.  
                                                            
6 Any increase in   will be invested in the safe technology leaving the volume of financial activity 
unchanged. Any increase in   will reduce borrowing and hence reduce the volume of financial activity.         This is no longer the case when the proportion of poor agents is high. As the 
proportion of financially constrained agents goes up the relative supply of the primary 
sector increases and the autarky price declines. The implication of this last 
observation for the patterns of international trade is straightforward. The higher the 
proportion of financially constrained agents, the more likely is that the country will 
export the primary commodity.   
  As noted in the introduction, the next section illustrates our results by 
correlating an indicator of a country’s export composition with data on its level of 
financial development, wealth and income distribution. Although our model is too 
simple to take directly to the data, it is informative to consider the corresponding 
relationships in the model. While   is the appropriate indicator of inequality in the 
model, the proportion of poor agents is not well defined when wealth is continuously 
distributed. In the latter case the Gini index (G) is  typically used as a measure of 
inequality, and the corresponding formula for our model is  
    
           
      
Unfortunately, G is not a monotonic function of   . An increase in   increases G if   
is low, and reduces G if    is high (specifically depending on whether   is less or 
greater than  1   /  
  
 ) 
Consider a world where countries differ only in their composition of rich and 
poor agents.
7 Those countries with a high proportion of poor agents (     ), will 
have lower per capita wealth, will tend to export the primary product and will have 
some agents who are financially constrained. Within this group, increasing wealth 
(falling  ) will tend to be associated with an increased (though weak) likelihood of 
exporting the financially constrained goods and an increasing Gini index. Indicators 
of financial development – [Total Lending]/[Total Wealth] (   1     1     /    ), 
[Total Investment by Entrepreneurs]/[Total Wealth] (=  1     /    ) and [Total 
Investment in the Risky Activity]/[Total Wealth] (=  1    /    ) – will also be 
increasing with wealth in this group. Countries with a low proportion of poor agents 
                                                            
7 Clearly this is not the only source of wealth differences. Suppose countries have the same   and the 
same asset ownership ratio of rich to poor (i.e.  /  is a constant), but differ in their levels of wealth. 
Then richer countries will be more likely to export financially constrained goods, will not be 
financially constrained (since     falls as wealth rises), but G is the same for all countries. The effects on 
indicators of financial development can be readily determined. (       ), will have higher per capita wealth, agents who are not financially 
constrained and will tend to export financially constrained products. Within this group, 
increasing wealth will tend to be associated with an increased probability of exporting 
financially constrained goods and a falling Gini Index. But in this group changes in   
have no impact on the corresponding indicators of financial development (which are 
given by 1   ,   and 1 respectively). 
In summary, in each case richer countries are more likely to export the 
financially constrained goods, but this may not be reflected in indicators of financial 
development for high income countries. At low incomes, an increased likelihood of 
exporting financially constrained goods is associated with a higher G, while at high 
incomes it is associated with a lower G. 
 
3. A Preliminary Look at the Data 
       We have argued that when financial markets are imperfect, the pattern of 
international trade will depend on both the extent of financial development and the 
distribution of wealth in the economy. A country is more likely to have a comparative 
advantage in financially dependent sectors if it (a) has high quality financial 
institutions and thus deeper financial development, and/or (b) is either wealthy or has 
an uneven wealth distribution.  
       In  this  section,  we  test  the  above predictions of our model by employing a 
generalised difference in difference approach to show that credit constraints are an 
important determinant of international trade flows. We regress the industry level of 
exports on the level of financial development interacted with a measure of external 
finance dependence and a measure of wealth inequality. More specifically, we 
estimate the following specification:  
                                                                 
                              
 
                          
                                   
where the X    denotes log exports in country c  in industry   in year  ,     is the 
level of external financial dependence for industry  ,  FINDEV is the level of financial 
quality for country c, and        is the level of inequality in country c in year t. The 
interaction of financial quality  with external dependence allows one to capture the cross sectional and time series variation at the country level through        and at 
the industry level through    .              is  the       level  of  endowment 
(including human, physical, natural resource) in country c and             is the 
      level of factor intensity (including human, physical, natural resource). The 
interaction between these endowments and their intensities is included to control for 
the traditional sources of comparative advantage. This ensures that any effect on trade 
from financial development and its interaction with external finance dependence is 
independent of these traditional sources.       is the log of country c’s gross domestic 
product.   ,   ,         are the time, country and industry specific effects where    is 
expected to capture any time varying omitted variables and    ,   account for country 
and industry specific omitted characteristics Our main coefficient of interest, is      
which is expected to be approximately zero or insignificant for high income countries 
as financial constraints are less likely to bind. For lower income groups we expect a 
negative coefficient which would provide evidence consistent with the theoretical 
model: those countries with low inequality benefit more from financial development 
given that in high inequality countries the demand for external finance is lower. 
       For robustness, we have also estimated a similar specification using a financial 
liberalization dummy, following Manova (2008a), replacing thus our measures of 
financial development. This new specification controls for endogeneity problems 
given that other researchers have shown that trade openness can also promote 
financial development (Huang and Temple, 2005; Do and Levchenko, 2007). 
       We do all estimations for the whole sample as well as for three distinct income 
group sub-samples split according to income classifications provided by OECD.  
 
3.1. Data Description 
       Our data set covers 91 countries and 27 industries for the period 1980-1997.
8 For 
export flows we use the data set in Manova (2008a) which aggregates to 3-digit ISIC 
industries data collected from the World Trade Tables. The unit of measurement used 
for the export flows is the value of shipment in US dollars representing the value of 
exports of the reporting country. The measure of external finance dependence is from 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). This variable measures the financing requirements in 
addition to any internal funds of each US industry. We use this measure as proxy for 
                                                            
8 The full list of sectors and countries is available in an Appendix available from the authors upon 
request. the financial dependence of the same industries in other countries.
9 This variable is 
calculated as the median ratio of capital expenditure minus cash flow from operations 
to capital expenditure for each industry over the 10 years from 1980 to 1989.   
       We use variables that measure the degree of financial development as proxies for 
the quality of financial institutions (the data is taken from Beck et. al., 2009).
10 The 
ratio of the level of credit obtained by the private sector from financial intermediaries 
to GDP (Private Credit) is a good measure as it captures the lending capacity of the 
financial sector and the use of funds and not just their availability. For robustness we 
also use the ratio of Liquid liabilities to GDP which is a broader measure of the depth 
of the financial system as it includes currency plus demand and interest bearing 
liabilities of banks and non-bank institutions.  In addition, we have estimated a 
specification replacing the measure of financial development with a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 after the country has liberalized its equity markets. The data 
on equity market liberalization are taken from Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005). 
       Unfortunately,  measures  of wealth distributions are unavailable,
11  and in the 
absence of a superior alternative we use the income distribution as a proxy for the 
wealth distribution. We take real GDP per capita, obtained from the Penn World 
Tables (Heston et. al., 2009), as a proxy for the mean of the distribution of wealth, 
and income inequality data is obtained from the newly compiled Standardized World 




       In  Table  2  we  present  the  results obtained from estimating the above model 
specification without controlling for the traditional sources of comparative advantage. 
Since we are estimating a conditional hypothesis we have included all the constitute 
                                                            
9 This strategy is also followed in Manova (2008b). The ranking of industries is available in the 
Appendix.  
10 Unfortunately, more direct measures of the quality of financial institutions (degree of contract 
enforcement, availability of creditors’ rights protection, legal origin and availability of credit rating 
institutions), are only available for a much smaller sample of countries. 
11 One possibility is to use the distribution of firm assets that can be obtained from firm level balance 
sheet data. But such data sets are available for few countries, and they usually exclude the small firms 
that typically are the most financially constrained. 
12 This dataset overcomes the problems of coverage and comparability affecting earlier datasets by 
employing a custom missing data algorithm to standardize the UNU-WIDER and the World Bank 
(Deninger and Squire, 1996) datasets.   variables found in the three way interaction to avoid any inferential errors.
13 The first 
column of Table 2 shows the estimation results for the whole sample and the other 
three columns show the corresponding estimations for each income group. Looking at 
column 1, we find that, consistent with our model prediction, countries with higher 
income tend to export relatively more goods from sectors that are financially 
dependent. This result also holds within the high and the middle income groups.  
              But our main interest is in the coefficient of the three-way interaction term. 
Column 2 suggests that the coefficient corresponding to the high-income group 
sample is insignificant. This implies that for high income countries the distribution of 
wealth does not matter given that these countries are wealthier and have better quality 
financial institutions. The same coefficient is significantly negative for the other two 
income groups. This is exactly what our model predicts. Among low income countries, 
an improvement in the quality of financial institutions will help promote the exports 
of financially dependent sectors more in those countries with lower income inequality. 
In countries with higher income inequality, the concentration of wealth implies that 
there are more agents with access to external finance.  
       We  test  the  sensitivity  of  our  results by controlling for traditional sources of 
comparative advantage, namely, natural, human and physical capital resources. We 
interact the endowments of these variables with the respective sectoral intensity levels. 
Table 3 reveals that our results still hold. As a robustness test, we also used private 
credit to private sector from banks as a measure of financial development.
 14  Our 
results still hold (see Table 4). 
       Finally, our results also hold when we use the financial liberalization dummy 
instead our measures of financial development. The only difference now is that for the 
middle-income group the sign on the three-way interaction term is not significant (see 
Table 5). 
 
4. Concluding Comments: Looking Ahead 
       Recent work in international trade has suggested that when capital markets are 
imperfect both the quality of financial institutions and the distribution of income can 
                                                            
13 See Brambor et al. (2006) for details of the resulting significant inferential errors resulting from 
omitting all the constitute terms of the multiplicative interaction model. We have only eliminated the 
variable EFD because is captured by the industry fixed effects.  
14  This indicator does not include non-financial institutions which may not be common in less 
developed countries.  be sources of comparative advantage. It is clear that healthier institutions provide 
better solutions to financial constraints arising as a result of frictions in financial 
markets. Thus countries with better institutions will have an advantage in goods 
produced by financially dependent sectors.  We know that there is a strong 
relationship between financial and economic development and thus it is not surprising 
that wealthier countries should also have a comparative advantage in these sectors.  
However, as our model suggests, a sufficiently high concentration of wealth might be 
sufficient for overcoming a lack of liquidity in financial markets. 
       Our empirical work offers some support for the theoretical predictions. Inequality 
should only matter for countries with low quality institutions since it is in these 
countries where financial markets are failing to allocate resources efficiently. Thus, in 
addition to controlling for the level of income we also need to focus on those 
countries with malfunctioning institutions.  
       These results are only preliminary. Future work must try to address the following 
issues. Firstly, in the present paper, we have used financial development indicators as 
proxies for financial quality. Ideally, we would like to use direct measures of financial 
quality that presently are not available for the whole sample of countries. Secondly, 
we have completely ignored the role of foreign direct investment. Multinationals can 
raise funds in international markets thus avoiding host country constraints imposed by 
poor quality institutions.
15 If the host countries are predominantly high inequality ones 
then what our results might be picking up is the effect of FDI rather than that of 
inequality on the patterns of trade. Lastly, direct measures of the wealth distribution 
or may even better the distribution of firm net worth would be better alternatives than 
the income distribution used in the present paper.  
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Appendix  
Table 1: Measures of Asset tangibility and External Finance Dependence for  
 each  Industry 
 
code  Industry   External Finance 
Dependence 
Ranking 
356   Plastic products    1.1401  1 
385   Professional & scientific 
equipment   
0.961 2 
383   Machinery, electric    0.7675  3 
362   Glass and products    0.5285  4 
390   Other manufactured products    0.4702  5 
382   Machinery, except electrical    0.4453  6 
321   Textiles    0.4005  7 
354   Misc. petroleum and coal products   0.3341  8 
384   Transport equipment    0.3069  9 
331   Wood products, except furniture    0.284  10 
381   Fabricated metal products    0.2371  11 
332   Furniture, except metal    0.2357  12 
355   Rubber products    0.2265  13 
352   Other chemicals    0.2187  14 
351   Industrial chemicals    0.205  15 
342   Printing and publishing    0.2038  16 
341   Paper and products    0.1756  17 
311   Food products    0.1368  18 
371   Iron and steel    0.0871  19 
313   Beverages    0.0772  20 
369   Other non-metallic mineral 
products   
0.062 21 
353   Petroleum refineries    0.042  22 
322   Wearing apparel, except footwear   0.0286  23 
372   Non-ferrous metals    0.0055  24 
323   Leather products    -0.14  25 
361   Pottery, china, earthenware    -0.1459  26 
314   Tobacco    -0.4512  27 
 
Source: Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
 
  
Table 2: Financial Development , Wealth Distribution and Trade 
Dependent Variable.: Industry level Export Full Sample HY MY  LY
Financial Quality  -1.225  0.072  -1.069  -1.925  
(Private credit- ALL/GDP)  (0.148)*** (0.396)  (0.343)***  (0.556)***
Gini 0.059  0.011  0.058  0.099   
 (0.007)***  (0.008)  (0.012)***  (0.024)***
Financial Quality * External    0.791  0.639  1.938  1.584  
Finance Dependence  (0.139)*** (0.455)  (0.493)***  (0.622)** 
real GDP   1.039  0.555  1.879  -0.442  
 (0.097)***  (0.144)*** (0.148)***  (0.234)* 
Financial Quality*Gini  0.029  -0.004  0.023  0.039  
 (0.004)***  (0.014)  (0.008)***  (0.011)***
Gini * External  Finance   -0.039  0.003  -0.069  -0.095  
Dependence (0.004)***  (0.008)  (0.016)***  (0.029)***
Financial Quality * Gini * External   -0.009  -0.003  -0.035  -0.026  
Finance Dependence  (0.003)*** (0.016)  (0.011)***  (0.012)** 
        
R-square 0.804  0.819  0.654  0.561   
# Observation  29144  11045  12915  5184  
All regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
* **, **,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  


















Table 3: Financial Development, Wealth Distribution and Trade: Robustness 1 
Dependent Variable.: Industry level Export Full Sample HY MY  LY
Financial Quality(Private credit-ALL/GDP) -1.017  -0.109  -1.823  -1.294   
 (0.159)*** (0.459)  (0.394)***  (0.694)* 
Gini 0.055  0.026  0.078  0.069   
 (0.007)*** (0.009)***  (0.014)***  (0.031)** 
Financial Quality * External    0.841  0.141  2.157  1.780  
Finance Dependence  (0.142)*** (0.476) (0.493)***  (0.672)***
real GDP   0.904  0.878  1.531  -1.125  
 (0.106)*** (0.216)***  (0.189)***  (0.272)***
Financial Quality*Gini  0.028  -0.007  0.039  0.032  
 (0.004)*** (0.016)  (0.009)***  (0.013)** 
Gini * External  Finance   -0.038  -0.010  -0.079  -0.098  
Dependence (0.004)*** (0.008)  (0.016)***  (0.030)***
Financial Quality * Gini * External    -0.010  0.021  -0.040  -0.030  
Finance Dependence  (0.003)*** (0.017)  (0.011)***  (0.013)***
Capital Resource Endowment(CRE)  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*  (0.000)**  (0.000)   
Human Resource Endowment(HRE)  -1.015  -1.564  0.054  -1.730  
 (0.158)*** (0.186)***  (0.306)  (1.178)   
Natural Resource Endowment(NRE)  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  
Capital Resource Endowment(CRE) (0.000)*  (0.000)  (0.000)***  (0.000)***
Capital Resource Endowment *   1.750  -6.526  4.526  2.203  
Capital Resource Intensity  (0.345)*** (1.329)*** (0.848)***  (2.081)   
Human Resource Endowment *  1.141  1.037  -0.197  1.835  
Resource Intensity  (0.076)*** (0.106)***  (0.209)  (0.654)***
Natural Resource Endowment *   0.115  0.141  -0.043  0.425  
Natural Resource Intensity  (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.022)*  (0.064)***
        
R-square 0.807  0.821  0.653  0.577   
#  Observations  25155  9614  11825  3716  
All regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 * **, **,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
















Table 4: Financial Development, Wealth Distribution and Trade: Robustness 2 
Dependent Variable.: Industry level Export Full Sample HY MY  LY
Financial Quality(Private Credit-Bank/GDP) -0.836  -0.213  -1.776  -1.282   
 (0.151)*** (0.368)  (0.432)***  (0.707)* 
Gini 0.055  0.034  0.082  0.075   
 (0.008)*** (0.010)***  (0.016)***  (0.033)** 
Financial Quality * External    0.876  1.464  2.942  1.319  
Finance Dependence  (0.155)*** (0.509)*** (0.603)***  (0.659)** 
real GDP   0.835  0.813  1.461  -1.101  
 (0.106)*** (0.216)***  (0.190)***  (0.266)***
Financial Quality*Gini  0.027  0.006  0.041  0.034  
 (0.004)*** (0.013)  (0.010)***  (0.013)** 
Gini * External  Finance   -0.038  -0.044  -0.102  -0.070  
Dependence (0.005)*** (0.013)*** (0.020)***  (0.032)** 
Financial Quality * Gini * External    -0.010  -0.028  -0.055  -0.018  
Finance Dependence  (0.004)** (0.018)  (0.013)*** (0.013)   
Capital Resource Endowment(CRE)  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  
 (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*  (0.000)   
Human Resource Endowment(HRE)  -0.903  -1.426  0.130  -1.648  
 (0.153)*** (0.183)***  (0.297)  (1.198)   
Natural Resource Endowment(NRE)  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001  
Capital Resource Endowment(CRE)  (0.000)** (0.000)  (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Capital Resource Endowment *   2.201  -5.510  4.606  3.158  
Capital Resource Intensity  (0.344)*** (1.295)*** (0.848)***  (2.119)   
Human Resource Endowment *  1.101  0.940  -0.206  1.682  
Resource Intensity  (0.077)*** (0.106)*** (0.209)  (0.658)** 
Natural Resource Endowment *   0.107  0.122  -0.041  0.400  
Natural Resource Intensity  (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.022)*  (0.064)***
        
R-square 0.807  0.821  0.653  0.578   
#  Observations  25101  9614  11771  3716  
All regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
* **, **,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  














Table 5: Liberalization, Wealth distribution and Trade  
Dependent Variable.: Industry level Export Full Sample HY MY LY 
Liberalization  -0.014  -0.236  0.023    -0.219 
  (0.155) (0.602)  (0.309) (0.537) 
Liberalization*External  0.702 0.690  0.559 2.290   
Finance Dependence  (0.234)*** (0.446) (0.549)  (0.884)***
real  GDP    0.840 0.733  1.391 -0.345   
 (0.094)*** (0.212)***  (0.156)***  (0.201)* 
Gini  0.011 -0.013  0.018 0.002   
  (0.005)** (0.021)  (0.008)** (0.009)   
Gini*  Liberalization  0.016 0.032  0.009 0.017   
 (0.004)*** (0.020)  (0.007)  (0.011)   
Gini *External Finance  -0.036  -0.008  -0.022  -0.023  
Dependence (0.005)*** (0.014)  (0.007)***  (0.009)***
Liberalization  * Gini*   -0.009  -0.019  -0.006  -0.050  
External Finance Dependence  (0.006) (0.016)  (0.012) (0.020)** 
       
Capital Resource Endowment(CRE)  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)*  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Human Resource Endowment(HRE)  -0.706  -1.280  0.456  0.385  
 (0.145)*** (0.170)***  (0.273)*  (0.744)   
Natural Resource Endowment(NRE)  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***
Capital Resource Endowment(CRE)  2.261  -4.753  5.845  2.469  
Capital Resource Endowment *   (0.310)*** (1.234)*** (0.767)***  (1.081)** 
Capital Resource Intensity  1.060  0.973  -0.239  0.587  
Human Resource Endowment *  (0.073)*** (0.106)*** (0.194)  (0.319)* 
Resource Intensity  0.100  0.139  -0.079  0.462  
Natural Resource Endowment *   (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.022)***  (0.057)***
       
R
2  0.800 0.820  0.656 0.664   
#  Observations  27449 9614  13093 4742   
All regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
* **, **,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
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